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IDR950 Sport Management

Good Governance in Icelandic Sport Federations

Garðar Óli Ágústsson
Jón Reynir Reynisson

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Preface

First and foremost, we want to thank our supervisor Christos Anagnostopoulos, both for providing us guidance during the process of data collection and during the writing of the thesis, as well as offering us this topic for research. Furthermore, we would like to thank Jens Alm of Play the Game for inviting us to Aarhus to attend a seminar on the usage of the NSGO questionnaire, as with the trust to be part of this exciting project and Dr. Arnout Geeraert for his teachings during the seminar and after. This research will hopefully provide the Icelandic sports environment with a better understanding of what good governance enfolds. As well as the importance of having good governance protocols incorporated within their national federations in order to elevate Icelandic sports.

Abstract

The motivation for this research was to become a part of a larger network and include Icelandic sport governance in a benchmarking study that is currently expanding. The research objective was to utilise the NSGO indicators to assess good governance implemented in Icelandic sport federations and answer the following research questions: a) How do Icelandic sport federations compare to those of larger European countries? b) Do the eight federations chosen by the NSGO project give an accurate indication on how all 34 federations in Iceland score overall? c) Do larger federations score better than smaller ones when it comes to good governance protocols? Based on the results of this research Icelandic sport federations do not compare well to those of larger European countries, the eight federations chosen for the NSGO report do not give an accurate indication on good governance in Iceland and larger federations do score higher than the smaller federations. Based on the results Icelandic federations are vulnerable due to their size, lack of skills, lack of resources (funding), and blurred lines of good governance practices. The federations implement only the most basic functions and there is also a need to develop routines that promote good governance protocols. Icelandic federations have an overall low score as they do not have various practices in place and there is a need to address these issues.

Key words: Good Governance, Sport Governance, National Sport Federations, National Sport Governance Observer

Contents

List of tables:

List of figures:

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is structured on the evaluation of good governance in Icelandic sport federations. The authors were recruited by Play the Game to conduct an evaluation of eight Icelandic sport federations. This thesis expands on that original research, including all remaining sport federations under the National Olympic Committee. In this chapter an argument will be made that good governance is beneficial for sports federations, the research objectives are explained as well as the structure of the thesis put forth.

1.2 Background

The world of sport has in recent years been plagued with corruption scandals and challenges to its legitimacy. With instances where individuals deliberately demonstrate inappropriate behaviour and misuse their power for personal gain. The use of obsolete governance structures and failure to balance board functions. This has led to the response of governments and sport entities to increase the measures of governance principles (Parent et al., 2018). The concept of good governance is however hard to define and measure, given the fact that federations function within different environments and therefore need a tailored approach for their operation. This has led to a research gap between communication and practice and more important between expectation and reality (Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, 2013).

The call for good governance in the sport world came much later than in the corporate world but has recently been brought to the surface. This can be explained by the traditionally large autonomy in the sport world and the fact that it has almost been completely self-governed from the start. With one of the aspects of the construction of sport today being rooted in the notable freedom of associations (Geeraert et al., 2014; Rochebloine, 2012).

By implementing codes of good governance, sport federations can enhance their legitimacy and improve their organisational effectiveness. This also leads to a more resistant attitude towards unethical practices. These practices can therefore help sport federations in building trust with stakeholders and governments. Sport federations need to have an understanding of what principles are needed and what will improve their function in order to enhance their autonomy. This can however only be achieved by joint actions from all stakeholders (Geeraert, 2017).

Corruption in sport can be difficult to define and the perception of what is considered corrupt behaviour varies both between sports and cultures (Maennig, 2005). In the subsequent discussion corruption will be interpreted as all actions that abuse the integrity of

sports and its governance in order to acquire power, monetary value or anything else of personal gain for the abuser (Kihl et al., 2017; Maennig, 2005). There are different examples of corruption in sports e.g., athletes using performance enhancing substances, match fixing, and bribery of officials for favours. All these types of corrupt actions have different motives behind them as well as different consequences (Kihl et al., 2017; Manoli & Bandura, 2020). The gravity of these offences varies in relation to the individuals involved and their position, the amount of money exchanged, and the corrupt practices in question (Manoli & Bandura, 2020).

With the commercial side of sports not having as much importance in the twentieth century as it does today, it allowed the sport world to implement their self-governance without having the state interfering as much (Geeraert et al., 2014). International Non-Governmental Sport Organisations, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are still holding on to their autonomy and usually avoid the intervention from the state in their operations. In Europe, governments have also been hesitant getting involved in the sport sector for the reason that historically they view it rather as a cultural or leisure industry much more than an actual business (Geeraert et al., 2014). This autonomy is also further imposed by the actuality that, like large corporate organisations in the global field, the international federations that oversee the world of sports can and have been choosing favourable environments that offer the most optimal regulatory context for their international activities as a home base (Geeraert et al., 2014).

The traditional self-governed pyramids that form the world of sport have recently been confronted with the attempts of the states to meddle with their policy processes, largely as a result of the commercialisation of sports and the stakeholder organisations that keep gaining legitimacy (Mrkonjic & Geeraert, 2013). This top-down pyramid structure that is known in sports has been said to be undemocratic seeing that those who find themselves on the bottom, which would be the local clubs and their players participating in the affiliated tournaments, are dependent on the regulations set at the top, in many instances these clubs and players are unable to have a beneficial impact on these regulations. Taking football as an example these players are a part of a club, with that club being a part of a national federation and that federation being a part of a continental federation such as UEFA, with UEFA then being a part of FIFA. These federations that govern the sport are then the one that provide the players with the corresponding licenses to play with the demand that they fulfil certain criteria regarding the regulations of the sport. This means the two highest placed federations determine the rules that other affiliated clubs and members must obey (Mrkonjic

& Geeraert, 2013).

This autonomy has however recently been put under questioning, largely because of the fast commercialisation of sports which has shed some much-needed light on large scale governance failures like bribery and corruption (Geeraert et al., 2014). Based on this it could be said that this far-stretched autonomy in which sports have been operating in has had a noticeable negative impact on their quality of self-governance (Bruyninckx, 2012; Geeraert et al., 2014). These large-scale governance failures include the official bid scandal for the 2002 Olympic winter games, which took place in Salt Lake City, where there was alleged bribery involved in order to secure the rights to host the tournament. This was one of the first official bid scandals but certainly not the last in a long line of major controversy involving several federations (Hamilton, 2010). A large scandal at the International Volleyball Federation was also discovered where the president allegedly managed to embezzle close to 33 million dollars by taking personal commission on contracts he negotiated on behalf of the federation. Then of course the biggest scandal or at least the most known involving the football federation FIFA. Out of numerous allegations the ISL (International Sport and Leisure) affair, which is regarded as one of the largest corruption systems in sports, was widely criticised as many of the highest-ranking officials in sport were revealed to be taking personal commissions in excess of over 100 million dollars. These examples alongside many other samples of improper management have emphasised the call for better governance standards regarding International Non-Governmental Sport Organisations, such as FIFA and the IOC (Geeraert et al., 2014; Jennings, 2007).

As the thesis is structured around the governance of sport organisations, an emphasis will be on how good governance can reduce corruption within that setting. This includes, but is not limited to, embezzlement and the exploitation of one's position. Embezzlement or fraud is a detrimental element to the integrity of sports governance which Kihl et al. (2020) studied in relation to the public's perception of numerous misconducts and the subsequent media coverage (Kihl et al., 2020). The exploitation of one's position for personal gain is another dimension of corruption within sport governance. Large sport organisations and the personnel in charge of managing them have repeatedly been found to have promised increased transparency and full disclosure in the public eye only to continue their dishonest practice and other corrupt behaviour (Jennings, 2011).

Governance and to govern has to do with being in control, making choices that ultimately have an effect on not only the organization, but also those that fall under the organization (Shilbury et al., 2013). Sport governance is an excellent example of how this

meaning to govern has implications for both the organization at the top and the sport clubs under it. The motivation for this research was to become a part of a larger network and include Icelandic sport governance in a benchmarking study that is currently expanding. Play the Game has already conducted this same research on the governance of sport organizations in multiple European countries as well as in Brazil (National Sports Governance Observer, 2018).

1.3 Research Objective

This thesis expands on the preliminary report that the authors have already conducted for the National Sport Governance Observer (NSGO) on good governance in Iceland. The original report contained the results of seven federations as well as the National Olympic Committee in Iceland, eight in total. In this thesis all 33 national federations under the National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland (NOC) will be examined, along with the NOC. The original seven national federations along with the NOC will be a part of these results. The research objective is to utilise the NSGO indicators to assess good governance implemented in Icelandic sport federations and answer the following research questions:

- How do Icelandic sport federations compare to those of larger European countries?
- Do the eight federations chosen by the NSGO project give an accurate indication on how all 34 federations in Iceland score overall?
- Do larger federations score better than smaller ones when it comes to good governance protocols?

After the following questions have been answered the results will be put into context, what they might imply for sport governance in Iceland along with suggestions on improvements, implications and future research.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of seven chapters, this one included, each serving different purposes. Chapter 2 includes the literature review where the topic of this research is put into context and the reader gets familiarized with the concept of governance, sport governance and the work of the National Sport Governance Observer (NSGO). Chapter 3, describes the settings in which this research was conducted in. The governance in Iceland is described and the

sporting environment in which the federations being evaluated operate in. Chapter 4, Method, outlines the methodology used in this research, philosophical stance and samples. Chapter 5 outlines the results of this study for the eight federations examined for the NSGO, the 26 federations examined for this thesis and the overall results for all 34 combined. Chapter 6 discusses what the results of this research imply, what implications they might have and attempts to bring overall context to what this all means. Finally, Chapter 7 serves as a summary for this thesis by concluding the research questions set forward at the start, discussing the implications these results could have, what the limiting factors were and what future research on this topic might include.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Underpinnings & Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter includes the literature review where the topic of this research is put into context and the reader gets familiarized with the concept of governance, sport governance and the work of the National Sport Governance Observer (NSGO).

2.2 Theoretical approach; Institutional isomorphism

Institutional theory can be explained by the rationale that for organisations to survive, they must assure the environment in which they operate that they are entitled to support based on their validity (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Different stakeholders apply demands of conformity such as government bureaus insisting on protocols and conditions to be met in order for the organisation to receive funding. Furthermore, organisations that operate in a comparable setting and wish to adjust to these external constraints are inclined to embrace a similar administrative structure (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). This resemblance between different organisations can be defined as institutional isomorphism (Washington & Patterson, 2011). A process that can be beneficial for organisations seeking legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organisations that adjust their procedures or approach to those adopted by other organisations find themselves in higher regard from the governing body as well as the community around them than the ones that differ from traditional conduct (Deephouse, 1996). This practice is apparent in sport organisations in countries like the UK and Australia in which most domestic and regional administrative sport organisations are significantly operating on an established standard (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

According to DiMaggio and Powell (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) institutional isomorphism can be categorized by three types of (institutional) pressures. First, coercive isomorphism, influenced by political pressure and the organisation seeking legitimacy. Second, mimetic isomorphism, influenced by paying attention to what other organisations in a similar field have done and a normal reaction to change. Third, normative isomorphism, characterized by a growing demand of professionalism within the organisation (Frumkin, 2004). Even though these three definitions are thought of as different, they can all have an impact on, and be ingrained within a single organisation. However, these three are usually the results of distinct situations. Of the three pressures, coercive isomorphism is the one that is most affected by external influences such as the setting in which the organisation is situated. Whereas the latter two, mimetic, and normative isomorphism stem from internal factors regarding the area of work and assist with defining different functions and frameworks (Frumkin, 2004). Coercive

isomorphism is a combination of the formal and informal demands applied to organisations by other organisations of whom they are reliant on, and by the cultural expectation from the society that the organisation is a part of. The demands can vary from strict requirements or as a persuasion to function in a certain way. The governing organisation can impose its will on organisations whose operations are within its field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism is, however, not as related to a higher authority but rather the uncertainty that can arise when dealing with precarious issues or unclear solutions. The uncertainty can encourage replication of other organisations actions and protocols which showed success (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). With pressure from external forces, organisations must adapt and conform to expectations. A simple solution is to embrace methods and frameworks that the highest authority has determined as legitimate, therefore, new organisations are inclined to model themselves on older ones (Frumkin, 2004). This process of imitation can unintentionally bring forth innovation as Alchion (1950) put it "*while there certainly are those who consciously innovate, there are those who, in their imperfect attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate by unwittingly acquiring some unexpected or unsought unique attributes which under the prevailing circumstances prove partly responsible for the success*" (Alchian, 1950, p. 218-219). Normative isomorphism for the most part comes from professionalisation. Homogenisation brought on by standards developed during education as well as the hiring of personnel from organisations in a similar field significantly increases isomorphism (Perrow, 1974; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

It would be reasonable to suggest that the two types of isomorphic pressures that seem to underpin the current research are mimetic processes with minor influence from coercive isomorphism. The highest authority, the NOC, has set basic standards that the organisations must uphold. The standards are not rigorous and the federations have much freedom to deviate from the common method in many areas of governance, in that context the mimetic processes become apparent. Smaller federations as well as the newer ones structure themselves in accordance to the larger more experienced federations as they are less prepared to face the adversity that may arise from the uncertainty of implementing new processes.

2.3 Literature review

The literature review mostly revolves around understanding the terms governance, good governance, and sport governance as these are the basis on which the research and questionnaire was built on.

2.3.1 Governance

One of the first notions of governance influencing political debates came up around the 80s during the era when governments were liberalizing market reforms. Officials, in the UK and the US, wanted to restructure governments to resemble values and principles of private properties and the market. At that time, the notion was that these reforms would help combat common problems such as corruption, incompetence in the economy and inconsistent laws in developing nations. In that regard, governance was used as a substitute for authority through organisations that could protect the markets from "*rent-seeking distributional coalitions"* (Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2013).

Organisational Governance can be described as a comprehensive way of including all standards, practices, laws and processes the organisation has to follow. These guidelines help lead the organisation's operations, management, and their conformity to national laws (Dimitropoulos, 2011). The concept of organisational governance is the attempt to regulate these elements which are essential to the organisation's systems and used to monitor and control day to day functions. For any organisation to function properly it needs effective governance, from large corporations to schools and non-profit sport organisations. Using this system effectively supplies organisations with a framework they can use to direct and control their business and create a certain degree of belief that is essential to a precise performance in the current market economy. This system also provides stakeholders assurance that their investments and time spent on behalf of the organisation is not wasted with the board acting in the best interest of everyone involved, including all stakeholders (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Much like organisational governance, the purpose of corporate governance is to establish compliance with the administration and to make sure that the organisation is improving its efficiency by using effective means for the board to supervise the administration's work. This type of governance has emerged as a pivotal problem for many organisations regarding control and other functions (De Barros et al., 2007; Dimitropoulos, 2011). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines corporate governance as "*a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined."* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015, p. 9). Corporate governance has a somewhat well-established objective, limited however, considering it is aimed towards the management of

large organisations which puts some restrictions on the concept regarding validity in space and time. Due to these factors, it is not a general representative in the overall framework for governance but has nonetheless a lot to provide towards it. Corporate governance played a large role in the process of bringing back governance as a topical concept and is supported by scientific and empirical research (Hufty, 2011). Even though establishing effective corporate governance has many advantages it comes with a lot of challenges, seeing that transforming an organisation's governance system means changing a system that has been ingrained in the institutional environment which they function in (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).

The downfall of corporations can be caused by various reasons with many falling because of fraud cases, controversial strategic decisions and shareholder suits which are all causing boards and the hierarchy of larger organisations to take notice when it comes to effective governance (Heracleous, 2008). Failure in corporate governance is not a rare occurrence with many of them being widely known, for instance the case of Enron, USA, or OneTel in Australia. The fall and failures of these former large organisations showcased the continued urgency for a more efficient standard of organisational governance in order to cover and look after the rights of stakeholders (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In order to improve the organisational effectiveness and raise standards of governance principles, many countries and institutions have created so called codes of governance or best practice procedures for organisations that are being ineffective when it comes to their governance systems (Heracleous, 2008). These failures also prompt major changes to the stock exchange with many governments creating standards for good governance, either forcing organisations or encouraging them to make adjustments to their governance practices (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). These codes are documents that contain the rules, procedures and best practices based on environmental factors in order to best manage and govern organisations. Establishing these codes is usually up to self-regulating professional bodies that have approval from appropriate government agencies, however the process of adopting these codes is entirely up to the board of directors who shoulder the responsibility (Adewale, 2013).

2.3.2 Good Governance

The concept of good governance is a comparatively new term and has gained much attention in developing and transitioning countries. Good governance touches on matters in society that involve administrative or legal organisations that try to carry out policies which can be seen as public goods or services that benefit society. In comparison, good governance can

have a much bigger impact on general well being than democratic measures. There have been certain issues with the concept seeing that it is relatively broad and researchers have wondered if coming up with a single comprehensive definition for it can be achieved or if good governance should have various meanings depending on the setting or country (Rothstein, 2012).

The Australian Institute of Company Directors describes good governance as "*existing where an organisation has systems and processes in place that are appropriate to its circumstances, and which enable the organisation to pursue its purpose effectively and meet its obligations under the law*" (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2019, p. 11).

In the process of specifying good governance it has been mentioned in the discussions of similar concepts in that field, such as democracy, corruption and efficiency. However, it could be said that good governance is in no way limited by these or other terms related to them (Rothstein, 2012). Mainly, good governance has been connected with productive and capable organisations and is similar in nature as administrations that work for improvement in the general well-being of people's life and involve them more in all decision-making processes. It is hard to limit good governance to a certain timeframe, seeing that there are many elements that can determine the features of good governance based on the organisation or situation. Characteristics such as the political culture, structure of the economy, various environmental features and values have to be considered when deciding if an organisation is maintaining standards of good governance (Asaduzzaman & Virtanen, 2016).

Good governance can be thought of as the process in which public administrations try to expand public interests. A part of its fundamental features is the collective management of public life carried out not only by the state but also the citizens. This feature also involves the current connection that the political state and civil society share, in addition to the ideal composition of the two. Out of all the perspectives that could fall under good governance, three have commonly been among the most mentioned as an essential part (Keping, 2018; Henry & Lee, 2004). Legitimacy, which describes a certain quality or state that society along with the government intentionally recognizes and follows. However, there are no direct connections to laws and regulations and from a legal perspective, even if something is legal it does not mean that it is legitimate. At least in political science, only the government and orders that are honestly accepted by society are considered legitimate. With a better standard of legitimacy, the levels of good governance will improve as well (Keping, 2018). Transparency refers to the availability of information regarding political matters. It demands

that information that concerns society is communicated and made available through different media in order for people to participate in policy making as well as overseeing the means in which the public administration is working in a capable way. As with legitimacy, when the standards of transparency increase, so do the standards of good governance (Keping, 2018). Accountability refers to individuals as well as organisations being held responsible for their actions and behaviours. This can relate to certain duties that are connected with institutions, positions within and how they compare in regard to their obligations. In that sense, accountability means that those who manage the institution must uphold the obligations and activities that their position dictates. Good governance therefore demands the adoption of both law and ethics in order to improve accountability in organisations and for individuals (Keping, 2018). External forces can further influence the emphasis put on accountability within organisations. The media and the society in which an organisation operates can demand that a certain standard of accountability is upheld (Shipley & Kovacs, 2008).

The idea behind codes of good governance is the attempt of setting guidelines for the board of an organisation or a legislative branch on how their governance practices could be best suited. These Codes are created in order to direct attention to insufficiencies in the system and propose a set of norms that boost certain aspects of governance such as accountability and transparency among organisational leaders. The requirement to obey these codes is in most cases up to the board of directors of each organisation and are often, at least in most countries, not legally binding according to their legal frameworks which means they have no particular legal basis (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). For instance in Australia, the not-for-profit sector has made a considerable contribution to the good governance of organisation, with the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) creating the Not-for-profit Governance Principles (2019) in order to support not for-profit organisations and their boards in achieving good governance. The first set of principles was published in 2013, with the latest edition being published in 2019. These principles are thought of as a helpful framework in assisting Not-for-profits in understanding and subsequently achieving good governance (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2019).

2.3.3 Sport Governance

Sport governance indicates the use of sovereignty, taking into account influence, jurisdiction, and the complexion in making decisions (Hums & MacLean, 2018). For a sport organisation, performance can be a myriad of different factors, for example the efficiency or effectiveness in its operations (Parent et al., 2018). Another necessary component is

transparency, which implies clearness and evident resolutions which can develop confidence from the organisation's stakeholders (Callahan, 2007). Similarly, upholding organisational homogeneity generates balance and control (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

The European Commission defines sport governance as *"The framework and culture within which a sports body sets policy, delivers its strategic objectives, engages with stakeholders, monitors performance, evaluates and manages risk and reports to its constituents on its activities and progress including the delivery of effective, sustainable and proportionate sports policy and regulation"* (European Commission, 2013, p. 5).

Sport governance has an essential element of needing to adhere to the accepted set of rules and regulations regarding the way the sport is played and the changes that might derive from them. This illustrates the way in which sport has historically had a hierarchical requirement for having in place a governing body that oversees that these rules are being adhered to. These governing bodies work on an international, national, state or in some countries, depending on the relevant structures, regional level and then of course the clubs that fall under their jurisdiction (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2015). There has become a general agreement regarding sport governance that a combination of elements from both the corporate world (corporate governance) along with elements from democratic governance should apply to the governance of sport organisations. This stems partly from the unique blend of characteristics that many sport organisations combine in their operations (Chappelet, 2017). When these organisations sell broadcasting rights or make deals regarding marketing rights, they are incorporating characteristics from commercial organisations and when it comes to rules and regulations regarding their sport it relates to the characteristics of public organisations (Chappelet, 2017). Regular customs and structures that were based upon the notion of amateurism in which sport organisations were modelled after originally have found it hard keeping up with the fast progress of professionalization in the sport world (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011). This evolution has created tensions among those who serve as volunteer decision makers and those who work as paid full-time employees. Those tensions have led to a situation where the decision-making process within the sporting environment is starting to become far more competitive with the national sport organisations aiming to achieve balance between these commercial forces which keep increasing with the goal of providing the community with sports (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2015).

When referring to the sport industry, there are various sectors which clubs and sport related organisations operate under. These sectors can be split into three different categories depending on the aim and function of the organisation which are commercial, public, and

non-profit (Pedersen & Thibault, 2019). The public sector contains organisations and departments which are government based and are developed by the public for the people. These include federal to local governments. This sector includes the national to state and regional federations along with the appropriate authorities that create and establish sport policies, supply funding and back agencies that supervise drug testing and oversee the progress of elite athletes (Hoye et al., 2015). It is often custom in some countries that these governmental branches support the non-profit organisations financially, and in some cases the professional clubs as well. These same branches also create policies that make sure that the citizens in their country all have equal access to sports in a safe way (Pedersen & Thibault, 2019). Non-profit organisations often include institutions that revolve around cultural, religious, or educational purposes. These include voluntary organisations who do not strive to gain profits but focus their attention on social issues and the needs of the community. Operating as a non-profit means that the organisation does not bring in any profits, with members in the organisation electing the people that come in and serve on committees and boards. Most local and national sport organisations are run as a non-profit organisation (Pedersen & Thibault, 2019). This sector also includes the community-based sport clubs along with the governing bodies, which regulate the sport, organise events and provide participants the opportunities to play and compete in sports (Hoye et al., 2015). Organisations in the commercial sector are the ones that strive to create profits. These include professional franchises, teams, or leagues, which all have an important place in the sport industry by providing sport related products and services to people (Pedersen & Thibault, 2019; Hoye et al., 2015). These sectors often cross paths by working together, like voluntary sport clubs who work with the government to get sporting facilities for their members or getting to use local facilities such as the local pool for swimming practice. These collaborations have many different purposes but are all there in order for the sport industry to grow (Pedersen & Thibault, 2019).

Maintaining a high level of good governance standards and being transparent is critical for any organisation regarding their credibility and overall efficiency. Sport organisations are no exception in this context and that covers all the major federations, both internationally and nationally. Trying to keep up the autonomy of the sport movement is no reason that compliance with good governance and transparency should be avoided (Rochebloine, 2012). In order to assess the outline of sport governance, setting basic guidelines is not enough without having in place some way of evaluating them. Such indicators have been produced with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) creating the

Basic Universal Principles of good governance of the Olympic and sports movement in 2008 (International Olympic Committee, 2008), Chappelet and Mrkonjic in 2013 with the Basic Indicators for Better Governance of International Sport (BIBGIS) (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013) and the Danish organization Play the Game published its Sports- and National Sport Governance Observer (Geeraert, 2015), starting in 2015, which uses indicators in order to assess dimensions of sport governance (Chappelet, 2017). There have also been published mandatory principles where the national governing bodies are required to carry out guidelines, with the Australian government in 2015 implementing 20 principles for sport governance (Australian Sports Commission, 2015) along with Sport England (Sport England, 2015) the same year, starting to promote their governance strategies (Chappelet, 2017).

In 2018, the Sports Governance Observer did an assessment of good governance in five international sports federations, including FIFA (Football Federation), FINA (Swimming Federation), IAAF (Athletics Federation), IHF (Handball Federation) and ITF (Tennis Federation). Federations were measured based on four dimensions using a list of indicators based on information available on their websites. According to the indicators used by researchers FIFA scored the highest with an overall score of 61% and with FINA having the lowest score of 24%. With FIFA being the highest rated in all dimensions apart from one, Democratic processes, where the IAAF topped the group with a 58%. Even though the following federations scores were considerably different, researchers found issues that seemed to be common for all five federations. Among those was the notable absence of a standard for appropriate conduct regarding for example, reporting on corruption, risk assessments, conflicts of interest and organising self-evaluations of the board (Geeraert, 2018).

2.3.4 National Sport Governance Observer

"*The aim of the Sports Governance Observer is to stimulate an open debate by providing an objective, reliable, and holistic overview of which elements of good governance are implemented by the included federations and which are not*" (Alm, 2019, p. 7).

The National Sport Governance Observer (NSGO) is an initiative that is run by the Danish Institute for Sports Studies (Idan), which has two branches, Play the Game or the International Sports Political Initiative and the Danish Institute for Non-Formal Education

(Vifo). The NSGO project is under the Play the Game branch whose objective is to raise ethical standards in sport and also to raise awareness for the freedom of speech in the sports world and to promote the importance of both democracy and transparency within sporting organisations. The project originally received a grant from the Erasmus+ program and brought together selected academics and sport leaders from selected European countries (Play the Game, n.d.; National Sports Governance Observer, n.d.).

One of the main objectives of the NSGO is to help and encourage national sport organisations around the world in raising the quality of their good governance standards using the NSGO indicators. They also have in place more specific goals which for example include, creating an environment where sport leaders can measure and compare good governance standards by using the NSGO indicators and to educate the stakeholders in sport organisations of the values and the many benefits maintaining a high level of good governance can have (Geeraert, 2017).

The indicators used in the NSGO project were developed by Dr. Arnout Geeraert, Assistant Professor at Utrecht University, based on relevant governance theories and various sets of principles published from around the world. These indicators are categorized into four different dimensions of good governance, transparency, democratic processes, internal accountability and control, and societal responsibility. These dimensions are split into 46 different principles that are measured using a total of 274 indicators. When applying these indicators to sport federations, they either score a 1 or 0 for each principle and get an overall score as a whole along with an overall score for each dimension. Depending on the overall results the federations then get categorised as either Not relevant (NA), Not fulfilled (0-19%), Weak (20-39%), Moderate (40-59%), Good (60-79%) and Very good (80-100%) (National Sports Governance Observer, 2018; Geeraert, 2017). The four dimensions have the following definitions: "*Transparency refers to an organisation's reporting on its internal workings, which allows others to monitor these workings. Democratic processes entail free, fair and competitive elections; affected actors' involvement in de-cision-making processes; and fair and open internal debates. Internal accountability and control refers to both the implementation of the separation of powers in the organisation's governance structure and a system of rules and procedures that ensures that staff and officials comply with internal rules and norms. Societal responsibility refers to deliberately employing organisational potential and impact to have a positive effect on internal and external stakeholders and society at large"* (Geeraert & Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 2018, p. 11).

The initial report contains 10 nations that have completed an evaluation on good governance in their national sport federations, with the results varying from a low of 27% to a high of 78% overall score for all eight federations in the relevant countries. The average score of all ten countries was 47% which corresponds as a moderate score. Regarding each dimension, the results showed that Transparency scores averaged the highest with 65% followed by Internal accountability and control 51%, Democratic processes 44% and the lowest scoring dimension being Societal Responsibility, with 38% (*National Sports Governance Observer*, 2018).

The report shows clearly that the degree of good governance varies substantially depending on the nation being evaluated and that good governance protocols are often scarce. These scores however, only show a portion of the practices of good governance that are being used in these federations. The indicators are created to try and capture a basic overview of where these federations stand regarding their governance and it should not be expected that all those principles should apply to every federation. Some might have their own procedures and can be expected to conduct their business in a different manner than other federations might (*National Sports Governance Observer*, 2018).

This tool has been utilised by other researchers to assess good governance in their home countries, with a team from the United States in 2019 using the sport governance observers methodology to look at 47 US Olympic National Governing Bodies, with the results showing an average score of 58% and varying from a low score of 41% to a high of 81% for the US Olympic federations (Pielke et al., 2019).

These indicators, or the NSGO Tool should therefore be considered to be a benchmark that federations and NOCs can use as a starting point for discussion on good governance and on what issues their federations might be facing (*National Sports Governance Observer*, 2018).



Figure 1: Overall NSGO index scores from all surveyed countries (National Sports Governance Observer, 2018).

2.4 Literature Matrix

This sub-chapter contains the literature matrix which compiles relevant sources and those papers that influenced this thesis. These sources can be found here below in table 1 and 2.

Table 1: Literature Matrix 1

Author/Date	Theoretical Concept	Methodology	Results	Conclusion	Implications for future research
(Chappelet, 2017)	The need for a new approach to sports governance that combines aspects of both corporate and democratic governance.	Outlining four possible scenarios for monitoring sport governance and discussing three important governance questions that are rarely addressed.	In terms of the integrity of sport, guaranteeing the 'responsible autonomy' of sport organizations, most of which are non-profit organizations, in exchange for adequate governance is arguably the best compromise between state and private control.	The paper shows that combating problems such as doping, match-fixing, hooliganism and sport corruption requires a wider international legal framework, developed through cooperation between government authorities and the sports sector.	Only international regulation will ensure sport gains the improved governance it needs in order to preserve its integrity and value in the eyes of the public.
(*National Sports Governance Observer*, 2018)	Benchmarking the level of good governance in 9 European countries and Brazil using the NSGO framework.	Using the NSGO benchmarking framework consisting of 46 principles and 247 indicators to assess good governance over four dimensions.	The average score of the NSGO country indexes of the nine European countries is 47%.	Despite the great variety between the countries, there are some overall trends that draw special attention and may inspire policy makers all over the world.	The NSGO Tool can be considered a benchmark that federations and NOCs can use as a starting point for discussion on good governance and on what issues their federations might be facing.
(Geeraert, 2018)	Benchmarking the level of good governance in five international federations using the sport governance observer framework.	The SGO benchmarking instrument which consists of 309 indicators, 57 principles to assess good governance over four dimensions.	With an average SGO index score of 38%, the surveyed international federations clearly have areas in need of improvement.	The results show a significant difference between those federations who have been embroiled in public scandal at the global level, and those whose work often goes under the media radar.	The aim is to stimulate an open debate by providing an objective, reliable, and holistic overview of which elements of good governance are implemented by these federations and which ones are not.
(Geeraert et al., 2014)	Structural issues regarding the quality of the self-governance of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies (SGBs) are analysed.	This study employs a triangulation of research methods (e.g., McNabb 2004). In order to determine whether the lack of good governance is indeed widespread among INGSOs.	The empirical evidence clearly supports the recent calls for improved governance in sport.	According to which SGBs need to agree upon, and act in accordance with, a set of well-defined criteria of good governance. Only then will the self-governance of sport be credible and the privileged autonomy of these organizations justifiable.	Future research could focus on outcome-based indicators such as the actual influence stakeholders can exert in decision-making processes.

Table 2: Literature Matrix 2

Author/Date	Theoretical Concept	Methodology	Results	Conclusion	Implications for future research
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)	Institutional change. Institutional isomorphism and isomorphic processes in organizational fields	Empirical study of relevant research regarding organizational fields.	The development of a new concept to describe institutional processes affecting organisations operations and behaviour.	Institutional isomorphism and the predictors of isomorphic change put forth alongside the three mechanisms of institutional change	Lack of research regarding the structuration of organizational fields as well as a more defined research on institutional isomorphism.
(Anagnostopoulos et al., 2019)	This chapter reviews the role of sport policy systems in shaping sport governance practice in Europe.	It does so by drawing on two studies commissioned and/or funded by the European Commission: The VOCASPORT Report and the National Sports Governance Observer.	A framework that maps out different types of national policies evident in the EU Member States, before outlining how the NSGO sought to inspire European national sports federations to enhance the quality of their governance.	Given that incidents of poor governance have not gone unnoticed by governments (irrespective of the degree of intervention), national sport federations must gain and/or retain their legitimacy.	They offer some directions for future research as well as how the four NSGO dimensions can be conceptualised by the means of a metaphor which the future of researching and practicing good governance in sport should all be about.
(Pielke et al., 2019)	This paper applies the Sports Governance Observer (SGO) methodology to 47 US Olympic NGBs (National Governing Bodies) of sport and discusses the utility of such constructs.	The SGO methodology using indicators to assess 47 US Olympic sports NGBs across 4 dimensions.	The results show that the US NGBs get a score of 81, high (out of 100) and a low of 41, with an average of 58 and a median score of 59.	They critique the limitations and value of such indicators and constructs in the context of good governance and discuss the implications for Olympic sport governance.	Whilst the SGO has value it is also accompanied by some significant limitations therefore it is important to ensure that measures of good governance extend beyond what an organisation might choose to present to the public and to examine the cultures, leadership and behaviours that underpin such issues.
(Parent & Hoye, 2018)	The objective was to determine what impact governance principles and guidelines have had on sport organisations' governance practices and performance.	A search of academic, grey literature and theses in sport and broader social sciences and humanities databases.	Although the link between board structure and organisational performance has been empirically found, the link between other governance principles and organisational performance remains lacking.	Despite an increased interest in good governance principles and guidelines in sport, there is a need for both the international sport community and researchers to develop an agreed set of principles for international, national, provincial/state and local level sport governance organisations.	The multidimensionality of the concepts of governance and organisational performance, as well as their interrelationship and the potential positive and negative impacts of implementing governance principles render this need even more critical.

Chapter 3
Research setting

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the settings in which this research was conducted. The governance in Iceland is described and the sporting environment in which the federations being evaluated operate is explained.

3.2 Icelandic Governance

The framework of Icelandic politics can be described as a constitutional republic with a multi-party parliamentary system (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2020). In Iceland there are 72 municipalities which administer zoning and planning in addition to providing the public with various services, like primary education, healthcare, social services, and public housing among other services. These municipalities, in 2017, had an expenditure of 13% of the Icelandic Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which makes them relatively large in the Icelandic economy (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2018). The economy in Iceland is based on the Nordic model, meaning it is an open high-income economy that combines a free market economy with the welfare state (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2018). Within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it has the smallest economy with the size of the economy only amounting to roughly 0,65% of the size of the German economy (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2018). A unique feature of the Icelandic economy is the small and unstable currency in which they use, the Icelandic Króna. This currency has a big impact on the exchange rate fluctuations on inflation (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2018), with Iceland being one of the smallest nations worldwide to have their own currency (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2020).

The laws in Iceland regarding public limited companies (Act on Public Limited Companies, No. 2/1995, n.d.) states that these organisations are required to have three decision-making positions classified in order to each other. These positions being the shareholders meeting, the board of directors, and the chief executive officer (CEO). This is to restrict the control and influence the stakeholders might have over the shareholders meeting, seeing that the board uses those meetings in order to pursue its authority and having control in between them (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The board has the authority and responsibility to hire a CEO, depending on the context they can be more than one, and make him/them responsible for the daily management of the organisation. Doing so the CEO must work within the direction and instructions the board sets. Good governance emphasizes that the distribution of power and responsibilities is suited in a way that the three decision-making positions classify, that there is a clear distinction between areas of authority and

responsibility of each position and members do not interfere with issues that are not under their jurisdiction (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2021).

According to article 66 on good governance in the Icelandic Act on Annual Accounts (Act on Annual Accounts No. 3/2006, n.d.) organisations must issue a statement, a separate chapter in the board of directors report each year that contains a declaration of its governance. This declaration has to contain a reference to the rules and guidelines of the organisation, the handbook on governance, information regarding principal aspects of the company's internal control and risk management, depiction on the functions and compositions of the representative body, board committees, board of directors and the executive board. Additionally, the chapter needs to contain a description of the diversity in the organisation (Act on Annual Accounts No. 3/2006, n.d.).

As has become custom in several countries worldwide Iceland publishes guidelines for corporate governance in order to clarify the roles and responsibilities of board members and company directors. Iceland's Chamber of Commerce, is a non-governmental organisation that serves as a platform for organisations and individuals involved in the Icelandic business environment to participate and aim their work towards improving this environment, publishes these guidelines alongside SA-Business Iceland (service organisation for Icelandic businesses) and Nasdaq Iceland (The Icelandic Stock Exchange) (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The aim of these guidelines is to assist companies in Iceland in meeting their responsibilities as organisations and with the continued rise in size of this publication implies that the awareness for good corporate governance in Iceland is growing. Since these guidelines were first published in 2004, they have been republished six times with the most recent update being published in the beginning of 2021. During this time Iceland has gone through a financial crisis, in 2008, and witnessed the downfall of three major banks which has proven to be a valuable lesson for Icelandic society. There is an increased awareness and understanding of what values of principles for good corporate governance bring and how they can affect an organisation's performance along with their long-term goals (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2015).

In Iceland, Insurance and Financial companies are legally required to follow these official guidelines on corporate governance (Act on Financial Undertakings No. 161/2002, n.d.; Lög Um Vátryggingastarfsemi Nr. 100/2016, n.d.). These guidelines can however be beneficial for all organisations regardless of their size or operation. In the newest addition of these guidelines for corporate governance in Iceland is the "comply or explain" rule which allows organisations to adjust these guidelines to their surroundings and gives them leeway

to decide how much certain parts apply to them. This allows organisations to follow these guidelines even though some parts of them are not being applied. Those organisations that deviate from certain principles do, however, have all the responsibility of explaining in detail why, in the separate chapter on good governance in the board of directors' report, they do not follow them. It is also encouraged that public organisations follow these guidelines as well (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2021).

In addition to publishing these guidelines, Iceland Chamber of Commerce, SA-Business Iceland, Nasdaq Iceland along with the research centre in governance at the University of Iceland have established an initiative where the aim is to improve transparency and credibility for shareholders and others involved by allowing organisations to undergo an evaluation of their good governance standards. Those who pass this formal evaluation can get a nomination as Exemplary in Corporate Governance. This process is voluntary and is any organisation free to apply (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2015).

In Iceland, organised companies that work for non-financial purposes are labelled as general companies/public associations. General companies are organised, permanent associations of two or more parties, established voluntarily by a private law instrument in order to work for non-financial purposes. As the composition of public companies is not provided for by law, the provisions of the articles of association are important for interpreting their legal position, in addition to which of the principles of company law are examined. Examples of general companies include political parties and sports associations (Icelandic Revenue and Custom, 2020).

3.3 Vocasport and the characteristics of the sport system

There is a lack of literature regarding Icelandic sport governance and sport systems. Nevertheless, the organisational culture and framework resembles that of other Scandinavian countries. A report produced by the VOCASPORT project in 2004, (see, VOCASPORT, 2004; Henry, 2009) supported by the European Commission on improving employment in the field of sport in Europe through vocational training, sought to make a distinction between various types of policies noticeable in EU nations. They characterised the sport systems of the Member states by constructing four parameters from four distinct configurations (Henry, 2009; VOCASPORT Research Group, 2004). The first, called the bureaucratic configuration, displays where the state has a high degree of involvement and is depicted with the ministry in charge of sport. It is portrayed by the fact that the public authorities have a very active role in regulating the sport system and there is in most cases a legislative

framework or a law on sport in place. The system is portrayed by the rules set by public authorities, with the voluntary sports movement acting with the assignment of responsibility and with the private sector having little effect on the policies being implemented. Among the states this policy system is displayed in is Belgium, Cyprus and France for example (VOCASPORT Research Group, 2004; Henry, 2009). The second, the entrepreneurial configuration, is defined by the levels of high involvement of the market forces meaning that the market discipline is therefore apparent in both the public and private sector. It is associated with the levels of engagement or co-ordination that the different stakeholders have on the sport system. In this setting the voluntary movement must adopt the claims that comply with the habits of private entrepreneurs and try to keep up with their position in this certain framework. The entrepreneurial configuration can be distinguished by the system of regulations that come from economic or social demands for sports (VOCASPORT Research Group, 2004; Henry, 2009). The third, missionary configuration, often referred to as the Scandinavian model, includes the states where the voluntary sector functions with delegated powers and relates to their role alongside the public and private sector when it comes to the matter of sporting provisions. It is characterised by the presence of a voluntary sport movement that works with great autonomy, with the state delegating most of the responsibilities when it comes to policy making. The voluntary sport managers have greater legitimacy than the employees, with the social partners having little presence (VOCASPORT Research Group, 2004; Henry, 2009). The fourth, social configuration, refers to the system's ability to adapt to changes in demand and only includes the Netherlands. It is defined by the behaviour of the social partners that are present in the versatile system. This system relies on the collaboration between several players instead of being controlled by a single dominant one. Those governing the system concern themselves mainly with using sports for the common good despite the tensions that can appear (VOCASPORT Research Group, 2004).

Based on the VOCASPORT's configurations, Iceland resembles the "missionary" form. It is thus characterised by a strong presence of a voluntary sports movement and autonomy to make decisions, with the state giving sport organisations authority in implementing sport policies and having legitimacy rest in the hands of volunteers rather than the employees. It has been on this basis that sports in Iceland were modeled. The local clubs have been arranged as voluntary community-level institutions, accessible to all who wish to engage in their activities. The country is divided into 25 different sport regions with 7 sport organisations as well as 18 regional unions. The NOC oversees 33 national federations of

different sports, all of whom combine for close to 104 thousand active members, almost 30% of the entire population of Iceland (Halldorsson, 2017; The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, 2019).

3.4 Icelandic Sport System

Sports have been a part of the Icelandic people and culture ever since the first settlers arrived and with them, Nordic folk wrestling. (Björn Bjarnason, 1950). Although the colonizers competed between themselves in this form of wrestling with many historic matches being recorded in the Icelandic Sagas, organised sports did not become apparent until the late 19th century when the first sports clubs were established (Íþróttabandalag Reykjavíkur, n.d.). During that period, several athletic clubs were founded, however, most of them had to terminate their operations before the turn of the century due to lack of funding and a lack of facilities (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, n.d.). Early in the 20th century the infrastructure for sports began to improve, a number of athletic clubs had been founded and in 1912 The Icelandic Sports Federation was established even though it had been four years since Iceland first attended the Olympics. Shortly after an appearance in the 1908 Olympic games, the need for a National Olympic Committee began to rise. This institution was established in 1921, however, it had to wait until 1935 before it was officially recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, n.d.). The two were not consolidated until 1997 when the National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland (ÍSÍ) was founded. Up until that time the NOC had been working as a single centralised organisation with an hierarchical leadership style. After the merger the management style changed to a more bottom up style, where the new organisation took on the role of overseeing all sport organisations in Iceland. Another governing body of organised sports is the Icelandic Youth Association (UMFÍ) which was established in 1907. It acts as the national association of youth organisations in Iceland with the purpose of organising youth associations and all members. Additionally they speak for the national associations in foreign matters (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, n.d.).

Within the sport clubs, who can be a part of a number of national sport organisations depending on the sports they offer to the community, full-time staff handles day to day business and operations whereas coaches are most often working as part-time employees or contractors. The national federations, not unlike the clubs, are non-profit organisations largely built on the work of volunteers such as the board and in less significant roles. Profits

and funds are used to further infrastructure and cover the salaries of management and staff. There are some exceptions to this standard, the football federation which is the largest of all subsidiaries of the NOC, in addition to receiving funding from FIFA and UEFA has much higher revenue domestically than all other national sport organisations who are reliant on government funding to survive. Because of this financial stability the football federation can afford and does recruit paid members in the board (Halldorsson, 2017). There is a clear difference between the sports leagues in Iceland and in most other countries, the Icelandic leagues are not considered professional, both in the strength of competition as well as how well compensated players are. Some of the larger sports are beginning to evolve; football, basketball and handball have started to bring in more revenue from commercialisation allowing them to better develop the sport in Iceland and making it a more professional environment. Professional coaches are becoming more common and the requirements they need as well as their support staff is increasing (Halldorsson, 2017). Even though Icelandic sports are not professional, they are also not completely amateur, they fall somewhere in between as semi-professional. Within the bigger sports in Iceland, especially team sports, most players have become semi-professional, requiring a contract with their club to be allowed to play. However, most players can not support themselves simply from playing their sport and therefore the majority is either a student or holds a second job besides playing sports. The importance of a dual career is evident, nevertheless it is not usually a focus of the organisations to address this and aid their players when it comes to these. The top two divisions in football and the top divisions in handball and basketball all fall under this setting of players having dual careers. Besides these three, the majority of other sports in Iceland are considered amateur and for the players competing, this means they must move to a foreign country to achieve professional status (Halldorsson, 2017, 2020).

One of the conflicts the national sport organisations face is the attempt of creating a more professional atmosphere while maintaining grassroot sports. The size of the country and the funding received limits the organisations to choosing one over the other and whilst professionalism is not quite possible, they do emphasize building better community-level grassroot sports. There is a considerable amount of studies on the benefits of organised sports involvement for youth and juvenile development (Halldorsson, 2017; Þórlindsson et al., 1992, 1997, 2000). However, in Iceland, research on this subject matter began to receive attention from scholars in the 1990's. This added recognition that came at the same time the NOC changed from a centralised organisation to a more decentralised one helped sports in Iceland progress in a community-level direction. An emphasis was on increasing general

sport participation, sport for all, and less focus was given to the highest level of play in which only a select few have the opportunity to partake in (Halldorsson, 2017). Now the system that is in place has better incorporated the role of the clubs as taking in children once their day in school is over. Many go straight from the classroom to the practice facilities and the municipalities offer financial aid by subsidising the cost of practice fees for the children. The cooperation with the municipalities has provided the sports clubs greater influence in promoting health and fitness of juveniles as well as contributing to further socialisation (Halldorsson, 2017; Þórlindsson et al., 1992, 1997, 2000). By giving priority to public health as well as accentuating sports for children, the sport clubs have less difficulties justifying their autonomy. The community-based focus of the sport clubs promises that anyone at the youth levels who wants to take part in sports can do so without exclusion of any type such as gender, religion and ability. It is only at the senior level that individual ability becomes a deciding factor. However, many clubs in the top divisions have affiliations with teams in the lower leagues and can assist players who want to continue playing sports and are transitioning from a youth academy to a senior level. This affiliate system does not only benefit the athletes, by having an affiliated club in the lower leagues the clubs in the higher divisions can send promising players to them for the players to gain experience against better competition than the youth academy provides. By widening the scope of their operations and having a positive impact on the nearby community through collaborations can increase the social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002).

Based on necessity, the sport clubs are mostly built up on the work of volunteers. Funding is limited and income mediocre, volunteers help bridge the gap created by lack of resources. One of the objectives of the clubs is to maintain a constant flow of volunteers and they do so by recruiting former participants and members of the club to help with roles such as serving as board members, taking on work in committees or refereeing for the youth departments (Halldorsson, 2017).

3.5 Sport policies in Iceland

ÍSÍ is the highest authority for voluntary sports activities in Iceland. Icelandic sports are divided into 25 sport regions, which are governed by ÍSÍ and an independent non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Icelandic Youth Association (UMFÍ). According to ÍSÍ statutes, ÍSÍ is governed by (a) the general assembly, (b) the executive board and (c) the executive council, with the general assembly being the highest authority in matters

concerning ÍSÍ. As with many federations in Iceland, the general assembly is held every second year, not yearly as is the custom in many other countries (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, n.d.). In between general assemblies, the executive board manages the affairs of ÍSÍ. As stated in its statutes "ÍSÍ operates independently and must resist all pressure, whether political, religious or economic, as provided for in the Olympic Charter" (Statutes of Íþrótta Og Ólympíusamband Íslands 2017, n.d.).

According to the ÍSÍ statutes, Iceland is divided into different sports regions, with each of them containing one regional sport union that works on behalf of the sport clubs in the region. The national federations act as an association for regional sport unions under the relevant sport and have the authority to interact directly with the sports club that falls under the relevant sport. The national federations hold the highest authority regarding all specific issues under their sport and are required to send ÍSÍ an annual report of their operations. These federations are governed by a) their general assembly and b) their governing board. If a minimum of five regional sport unions where a relevant sport is practiced, having at least 250 active members, request the funding for a national federation, the ÍSÍ board is required to take the initiative in doing so (Statutes of Íþrótta Og Ólympíusamband Íslands 2017, n.d.).

According to Icelandic Sport Law (Sports Act No. 64/1998, n.d.) the Ministry of Education Science and Culture has supervision over sport-related matters. The minister of education and culture appoints a sport committee that consists of five members; its purpose is to provide the ministry consultation regarding matters related to sport. The sport committee makes suggestions to the ministry on financial contributions and distribution to sport under the government budget. Sports in Iceland is funded by the state and municipalities. The state funds the NOC, with the municipalities funding their local sport clubs, offering facilities for the community. In 2019 the state granted the NOC with funds of 617.666.667 ISK which were then divided among the federations (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, 2019). A part of this funding goes to a specific achievement fund (e. Afrekssjóður) whose purpose is to support the development of elite sport in Iceland by providing support to the federations financially and assisting them in helping Icelandic athletes achieve success on international grounds. Every federation under the NOC can apply for a grant from this fund once per year, with the requirements being they have an achievement plan and have specific aims and objectives in place. Each federation gets a ranking based on their recent sporting involvement on international grounds, which are a) Elite Federation (e. Afrekssérsambönd), b) International Federation (e. Alþjóðleg sérsambönd) and c) Development Federation (e. Þróunarsérsambönd). The

Board of the ÍSÍ Achievement Fund defines the amounts to be distributed in each category and determines the amount of grants in each case (Reglugerð Um Afrekssjóð ÍSÍ 2019, n.d.).

With the increased funding coming in from the professional sports world, especially in football (far less in other sports), has had an important impact on the small economy in Iceland. It has boosted the Icelandic Football Federation and their clubs by using these additional funds to further develop the sport in Iceland and as an aid in expanding their infrastructure, increasing the education of coaches and in building better sport facilities (Halldorsson, 2017). This development of global sport politics and its impacts has been noticed in Iceland, seeing that since the men's senior football team qualified for the 2016 UEFA European Championship, the budget for the achievement fund grew by 100.000.000 ISK yearly until 2019. Increasing from 100.000.000 ISK in 2016 to 400.000.000 ISK in 2019 (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, 2020).

Iceland also has an annual Sport Fund which is allocated with funds from congress to further sport development in Iceland with research and innovation and to gather information for policy making (Sports Act No. 64/1998, n.d.). The Icelandic Centre for Research (Rannis) administers the sport fund in Iceland with the budget according to financial law in 2018 being 19.400.000 ISK. This fund is for public bodies or non-profit organisations active in the field of sport in Iceland, such as sport clubs, public bodies in charge of sport at local, regional or national level, sport organisations at local, regional or national level, coordinators of national sport events. According to sport fund regulations, any grant not used goes back to the fund for allocation (The Icelandic Centre for Research, 2019).

Additionally, Sports in Iceland receive funding from the Icelandic Lottery which is an association owned by the National Olympic and Sports Association (ÍSÍ), The Icelandic Youth Association (UMFÍ) and The Icelandic Disability Alliance (ÖBÍ). It was established to operate the lottery and provides various different services, such as betting on different sports and participating in European lottery games, the Euro Jackpot and Viking Lotto. The Lottery's intentions are to raise funds for the promotion of sports in Iceland, within both ÍSÍ and UMFÍ, and for the initial costs of housing for the disabled on behalf of The Icelandic Disability Alliance (ÖBÍ) (Reglugerð Fyrir Íslenskar Getraunir Nr. 166/2016, n.d.).

In comparison with elite sports in other Western countries, Iceland is far from comparable, financially. The dynamics that have been associated with successful sporting nations and are used in the professional world of sports, such as their systematic approaches and scientific methods, are not maintained in Icelandic sports infrastructure. In a report on

elite sports made by the Icelandic NOC back in 2015, they report that Icelandic athletes develop under very dissimilar sporting environments than from what is offered by other nations in international competitions. Also, in order to bring elite sports in Iceland closer to others, they would need about five times more funding than what the state was giving at that time. The increase in funding in recent years is hopefully a step in the right direction but recent numbers suggest that the achievement fund is still only accommodating for about 30% of the federation's needs, which is still an increase from the 11% it was in 2015 (The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, 2015). With the state funding the NOC and the federations, the municipalities play a bigger role in funding the local sport clubs in the community (Halldorsson, 2017).

Chapter 4
Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This research is exploratory, where the focus is on gaining insight and familiarity with good governance in Iceland. The process is quantitative where the data is collected through federations websites (e. Desktop research) and confirmed with interviews or questionnaire. The logic is deductive, and the outcome will be basic seeing that the data collection is to enhance knowledge. This chapter outlines the methodology used in this research, philosophical stance and samples.

4.2 Philosophical stance

According to Burrell & Morgan's (1979) framework for organisational analysis, there are four paradigms that can be used to make assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). These four paradigms are the interpretive, where the perspective is that there is no external concrete form of social reality, although it still has regulations and orders in place. Here the regulations are more subjective, with the researcher trying to deconstruct his process by looking at the subject through his eyes and interpretation. In this paradigm the aim is to gain insights and explanations in order to uncover structures and processes in organisations (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 1991; Darman et al., 2017). The radical humanist, which has similar viewpoints as the interpretivist, by making the assumption that our daily life is a social construct, but with the difference that this paradigm takes a stance of a considerably more decisive assessment. Here the aim is to free members of organisations from being exploited, repressed or dominated with an analysis of the structures in modern society and finding ways to change them (Hassard, 1991; Darman et al., 2017). The functionalist, which goes by the assumption that society is concrete and is developed with the aim of maintaining order and regulation. The aim is to create knowledge that is important when looking at society and emphasis on understanding the current situation but less so on changing the way it is currently. Those examining the situation will focus more on getting realistic explanations on why something is happening without actually trying to change it (Hassard, 1991; Darman et al., 2017). The radical structuralist goes by the fundamentals that there are hidden conflicts and consistencies that create an unjust and flawed society in which we live in. This paradigm is more objective and sees organisations as a concrete entity, which can be felt or touched. Whereas the functionalist does not desire change but to understand the current situation, the radical structuralist aim is to change it. It makes the assumption that structural change has to be done within objective thinking (Hassard, 1991; Darman et al., 2017).

This thesis falls under the Functionalist paradigm since this is quantitative research and the objective is more concerned with a rational explanation of why a particular organisational phenomenon or problem is occurring and developing a set of recommendations within the current structure of the organisation's current management without any intentions of changing these structures.

Figure 2: Four Paradigms of Organisation analysis (Darman et al., 2017)

4.3 NSGO Methodology

Standardised data gathering process from the NSGO tool:
(Taken from the NSGO Indicators and instructions report (Geeraert & Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 2018)).

In order to ensure reliable data, official NSGO partners are required to follow a standardised process when collecting data. The process, outlined below, comprises six phases. Both the data collection and aggregation processes require significant resources. The standardised data gathering process takes about one week per federation to complete.

Phase 1: Selecting and contacting: Make a selection of the federations to be reviewed. Contact the federations and explain the process (outline, time frame, benefits for federations, confidentiality). Establish a contact point, i.e. a federation representative who can assist you with data gathering. In case of refusal, explain that scoring will take place on the basis of publicly available data and give the opportunity to give feedback on the data gathered (phases 3 and 5).

Phase 2: Data gathering and first preliminary scoring: Conduct desktop research: analyse the federations' websites, statutes, internal regulations, and any other relevant available documents. Apply the indicators and conduct a preliminary scoring to get a clear view of the completeness of the collected data. Fill in the standardised scoring sheets: fill in the 'evidence' field for every indicator. Briefly mention where the data was found.

Phase 3: Feedback: Send the federations a questionnaire in which you ask them to provide missing data. If necessary, conduct an interview and ask for additional evidence (e.g. official documents, emails, newsletters, etc.).

Phase 4: Second preliminary scoring: Conduct a second preliminary scoring on the basis of the feedback received. Be strict, so that the burden of proof lies with the federations. Fill in the standardised scoring sheets: fill in the 'evidence' field for every indicator. Briefly mention where data was found. In case the data was obtained from the interview/questionnaire, this should be indicated. Write comments in case of uncertainty so that you (or an external party) can review the scores later.

Phase 5: Final feedback: Send the scores to the federations and ask for their feedback and additional evidence in case of disagreement. Conduct a second interview, if any uncertainties remain.

Phase 6: Final scoring: Conduct the final scoring and inform the federations.

The desktop research is conducted by using the NSGO standardised score sheet (See, appendix) which consists of four different dimensions: transparency, democratic processes, internal accountability and control, and societal responsibility. These dimensions are split into 46 different principles that are measured using a total of 274 indicators. When applying these indicators to sport federations, they either score a 1 or 0 for each principle and get an overall score as a whole along with an overall score for each dimension. Depending on the overall results the federations then get categorised as either Not relevant (NA), Not fulfilled (0-19%), Weak (20-39%), Moderate (40-59%), Good (60-79%) and Very good (80-100%) (Geeraert & Danish Institute for Sports Studies, 2018).

4.4 NSGO Training

Before the initial report for good governance in Iceland was conducted a training seminar was hosted in Aarhus, Denmark between November 18-19, 2019 by Play the Game for all those who were involved in the second phase of the NSGO research. Attending this seminar were both students and academics as well as government officials from over 10 countries who are all interested in examining good governance in their respective country and receiving precise instruction on how the NSGO tool works and how to utilize it for their research. Therefore, before the data collection began, the authors of this thesis received detailed instructions and education on how to use the NSGO tool to assess good governance in national federations (National Sports Governance Observer, 2019).

4.5 Method

Since this thesis is expanding on research conducted by the authors for Play the Game (NSGO) (Not yet published when this thesis is written), the data collection was conducted in two separate phases. The first phase for the initial report for the NSGO and then for the thesis. In the following sub-chapters, the data collection process for each phase is described.

4.5.1 NSGO Report

For the initial report, a sample of eight federations was chosen in accordance with the NSGO methodology. There are five mandatory federations that all participants must benchmark: football, handball, athletics, swimming and tennis. Furthermore, researchers are asked to include three federations of their choice that could represent high participation or cultural relevance in their representative country. The National Olympic and Sports Association of Iceland, which is the highest authority for voluntary sports activities in Iceland; the Golf federation, which has the second highest membership of federations in Iceland; and the National Equestrian Federation, were chosen by the authors to be included in the report. This sample had two medium-sized federations, meaning it has 10 or more but fewer than 30 full-time employees and six small-sized federations, which means there are fewer than 10 full-time employees. In Iceland, there are no large federations, with 30 or more full-time employees.

The data collection for the report was conducted in the months of December and January 2019-2020, with the interviews with federations to confirm the desktop research taking place in February and in September 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic had some

implications on the process and the deadlines for the report, meaning that the data was re-evaluated in September 2020 and verified. An e-mail was sent to all federations in the beginning of January 2020 to inform them on the scope of this research project. After the initial contact, a second e-mail was sent to confirm interest in co-operating and a meeting was scheduled. Before the meeting, each federation received their Score Sheet so they could prepare themselves for the meeting. Meetings lasted on average two hours. In all cases, the federations' representatives were their CEO, with some federations having an additional staff member present in order to assist. These additional staff members varied from board president to general office staff. All interviews took place in each federation's office space, with one exception where a meeting took place digitally through Microsoft teams. Table 3 offers an overview of the data collection process. The interviews were conducted between the days of 14-20 February 2020, apart from the one meeting that had to be conducted in September 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The standardised NSGO indicators and score sheets were used to assess the federations by looking at information available on the federations websites and then conducting interviews with a representative/s from the federation to verify the findings like the NSGO methodology dictates. The only federation that did not respond when contacted, and therefore gave no additional feedback on its scoring was the Tennis Federation.

Table 3: Sport, official name, and official acronym of sample federations (NSGO)

Sport	Official Name	Acronym	Number of affiliated clubs	Number of affiliated members	Size, #employees
Athletics	Frjálsíþróttasamband Íslands	FRÍ	23	4,507	Less than 10
Golf	Golfsamband Íslands	GSÍ	61	17,846	Less than 10
Handball	Handknattleikssamband Íslands	HSÍ	32	7,677	Less than 10
NOC	Íþrótta-og Ólympiusamband Íslands	ÍSÍ	33	104,042	10 or more, but less than 30
Football	Knattspyrnusamband Ísland	KSÍ	161	27,993	10 or more, but less than 30
Equestrian Sports	Landssamband Hestamannafélaga	LH	44	11,793	Less than 10
Swimming	Sundsamband Íslands	SSÍ	26	4,232	Less than 10
Tennis	Tennissamband Íslands	TSÍ	9	1,629	Less than 10

4.5.2 Thesis

The Icelandic Olympic and Sports Association has 33 affiliated sport federations. For this thesis the remaining 26 sport federations under the NOC were assessed and then combined with the eight from the initial report. These federations can be seen in table 4, here below. This sample was all classified as small federations (fewer than 10 full-time employees). The data collection was conducted in the months of December and January 2020-2021, due to the Covid-19 pandemic and social restrictions in Iceland, conducting interviews with the federations was not possible. Instead, an email was sent to each federation, in April, 2021, to inform them on the scope of this research project, with the questionnaire attached, asking the federations to provide information on any missing data. Which is still according to the NSGO methodology (Phase 3) as it was not deemed necessary to conduct any interviews based on the interviews conducted in the initial report and how similar these federations are when it comes to their operation. Emails were sent to either or both the CEO and President of the federation along with the general email of the federation. Out of the 26 federations that received the email, only five responded. Leaving 21 federations with unverified scores. After sending out emails for verification and receiving the few responses the score sheets were looked over again to ensure no mistakes were made in the initial evaluation.

The standardised NSGO indicators and score sheets were used to assess the federations by looking at information available on the federations websites and then sending the federations the questionnaire to verify any missing data, like the NSGO methodology dictates.

Table 4: Sport, official name, and official acronym of sample federations (Thesis)

Sport	Official Name	Acronym	affiliated clubs	affiliated members	#employees
Motor Sports	Akstursíþróttasamband Íslands	AKÍS	11	1,467	Less than 10
Badminton	Badmintonsamband Íslands	BSÍ	32	6,300	Less than 10
Volleyball	Blaksamband Íslands	BLÍ	56	3,195	Less than 10
Archery	Bogfimisamband Íslands	BFSÍ	11	853	Less than 10
Table Tennis	Borðtennissamband Íslands	BTÍ	21	533	Less than 10
Dance Sport	Dansíþróttasamband Íslands	DSÍ	7	2,714	Less than 10
Gymnastics	Fimleikasamband Íslands	FSÍ	28	14,127	Less than 10
Icelandic Wrestling	Glímusamband Íslands	GLÍ	20	592	Less than 10
Cycling	Hjólreiðasamband Íslands	HRÍ	27	1,801	Less than 10
Boxing	Hnefaleikasamband Íslands	HNÍ	7	2,114	Less than 10
Ice Hockey	Íshokkísamband Íslands	ÍHÍ	3	633	Less than 10
Paralympic Sports	Íþróttasamband fatlaðra	ÍF	16	1,042	Less than 10
Judo	Judosamband Íslands	JSÍ	10	1,028	Less than 10
Karate	Karatesamband Íslands	KAÍ	13	1,568	Less than 10
Bowling	Keilusamband Íslands	KLÍ	4	423	Less than 10
Powerlifting	Kraftlyftingasamband Íslands	KRA	18	1,375	Less than 10
Basketball	Körfuknattleikssamband Íslands	KKÍ	42	8,313	Less than 10
Olympic Weightlifting	Lyftingasamband Íslands	LSÍ	13	917	Less than 10
Motorcycle- and Motor Sled Sports	Mótorhjóla- og Snjósleðaíþróttasamband Íslands	MSÍ	20	2,793	Less than 10
Sailing	Siglingasamband Íslands	SÍL	12	1,809	Less than 10
Skating	Skautasamband Íslands	ÍSS	4	558	Less than 10
Skiing	Skíðasamband Íslands	SKÍ	23	1,503	Less than 10
Shooting Sport	Skotíþróttasamband Íslands	STÍ	17	5,509	Less than 10
Fencing	Skylmingasamband Íslands	SKY	2	1,248	Less than 10
Taekwondo	Taekwondosamband Íslands	TKÍ	16	1,254	Less than 10
Triathlon	Þríþrautarsamband Íslands	ÞRÍ	7	432	Less than 10

Chapter 5
Results

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the results of this study. First, the overall results for all 34 federations are examined along with each dimension. Secondly, the results for the NSGO report are outlined and lastly, a comparison of the results of all three samples (The eight federations for the NSGO, the 26 federations for this thesis and the overall results for all 34 combined).

5.2 Results

The average results for all 34 Icelandic Federations (33 Federations along with the Umbrella Federation) was 28%, which is considered weak based on NSGO labels. The highest average dimension score was Transparency, with 47%, which is considered moderate. The dimensions of Democracy (26%) and Accountability (25%) are both weak. The lowest-ranked dimension was Societal Responsibility with a score of 12%, which is considered not fulfilled.

Table 5: Average results for all federations

Sport	Overall	Transparency	Democracy	Accountability	Societal Responsibility	Index
Archery	28%	51%	33%	20%	9%	Weak
Athletics	36%	77%	33%	24%	8%	Weak
Badminton	21%	39%	21%	19%	6%	Weak
Basketball	28%	44%	26%	25%	17%	Weak
Bowling	27%	60%	25%	24%	0%	Weak
Boxing	18%	29%	15%	18%	9%	Not fulfilled
Cycling	21%	31%	23%	20%	8%	Weak
Dance Sport	27%	42%	27%	29%	8%	Weak
Equestrian	27%	65%	21%	20%	0%	Weak
Fencing	13%	14%	17%	16%	5%	Not fulfilled
Football	53%	68%	54%	56%	32%	Moderate
Golf	44%	72%	45%	32%	25%	Moderate
Gymnastics	40%	62%	31%	47%	21%	Moderate
Handball	39%	62%	22%	51%	19%	Weak
Ice Hockey	24%	37%	19%	27%	12%	Weak
Icelandic Wrestling	23%	51%	21%	18%	3%	Weak
Judo	26%	40%	27%	24%	14%	Weak
Karate	24%	48%	21%	20%	5%	Weak
Motor Sports	28%	50%	24%	19%	17%	Weak
Motorcycle- and Motor Sled Sports	20%	29%	25%	14%	10%	Weak
NOC	46%	72%	32%	31%	49%	Moderate
Olympic Weightlifting	19%	29%	23%	14%	9%	Not fulfilled
Paralympic Sports	31%	60%	18%	33%	12%	Weak
Powerlifting	23%	29%	23%	32%	9%	Weak
Sailing	21%	48%	20%	12%	4%	Weak
Shooting Sport	23%	37%	25%	18%	13%	Weak
Skating	35%	57%	27%	35%	21%	Weak
Skiing	23%	33%	17%	25%	17%	Weak
Swimming	39%	68%	45%	36%	5%	Weak
Table Tennis	23%	49%	19%	14%	9%	Weak
Taekwondo	22%	33%	29%	19%	8%	Weak
Tennis	17%	28%	29%	8%	2%	Not fulfilled
Triathlon	19%	27%	21%	15%	14%	Not fulfilled
Volleyball	32%	51%	27%	33%	16%	Weak
Average	28%	47%	26%	25%	12%	Weak
Max	53%	77%	54%	56%	49%	
Min	13%	14%	15%	8%	0%	



Figure 3: Overall Score

Dimension 1: Transparency

The transparency dimension had the best results of all four dimensions for the Icelandic national sport organisations. This dimension had an average score of 47% across all organisations, the highest individual score of 77%, FRÍ (athletics), and the lowest individual score is 14%, SKY (fencing). Ten organisations achieved a good score, between 60% and 79%, eleven scored between 40% and 59% (moderate), twelve scored between 20% and 39% (weak), and one organisation had a score of less than 20% (not fulfilled). Within this dimension there are seven principles. Principles 1 *'The organisation publishes its statutes/ constitution, internal regulations, organisation chart, sports rules and multi-annual policy plan on its website'* and 5 *'The organisation publishes information about its members (athletes and clubs) on its website'* both rounded up to an average score of 75% which is considered a good score. Likewise, principle 2 *'The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general assembly meeting on its website'* achieved a good score, however, with a lower average of 65%. These three principles within the transparency dimension are also the only principles in the entire database that had an average score of good, only two other principles scored higher, both at very good. Within this dimension, one principle is an outlier, principle 7 '*The organisation publishes regulations and reports on the remuneration, including compensation and bonuses, of its board members and management on its website'* only reached a 5% average, ranked as not fulfilled. Seven organisations fulfilled the requirements for one of the four questions, scoring a 25% average within the principle and

the other 27 organisations scored a 0%, not meeting the requirements for any of the questions within the principle.



Figure 4: Transparency - Overall results

Dimension 2: Democratic processes

The second dimension is democratic processes. This dimension contains 13 principles. The average score in this dimension was the second highest of the four at 26%, considered weak. The highest individual score is that of KSÍ (football) at 54% or moderate, and the lowest score is HNÍ (boxing) at 15% or not fulfilled. Although the dimension as a whole scored a weak 26% on average, two principles in this dimension stood out as the highest in the database. Principle 8 *'Board members are democratically (re-)appointed according to clear procedures'* has the highest average of all 46 principles at 86% or a very good score. Similarly, principle 13 *'The general assembly represents all affiliated members and meets at least once a year'* achieved a very good score, 80% on average which was the second highest scoring principle in the database. These two are the only principles who reached a very good score of 80% or higher. Additionally, to having the highest scoring principles, this dimension also had the lowest scoring one. Principle 18 *'The organisation ensures the participation of volunteers in its policy processes'* is the only principle that had an average score of 0%, not fulfilled, as no organisation met the requirements regarding volunteer involvement in their policy processes. Including principle 18, the dimension had a total of

seven indicators, a majority within this dimension, who were ranked as not fulfilled, the scores ranging between 0% up to 12% on average. Three principles had a weak score, averaging between 25% and 28%, and principle 10 *'The organisation has a nomination committee'* reached a moderate score with an average of 47%. No principle within this dimension had a score ranked as good 60-79%.



Figure 5: Democracy - Overall Results

Dimension 3: Internal Accountability

The third dimension is internal accountability with the average score for all Icelandic sport organisations being 24% or weak. This dimension has the most principles within it at 14. The highest scoring organisation was again KSÍ (football) at 56%, and the lowest scoring one was TSÍ (tennis) at 8%. Dimension 3 had a similar total average as dimension 2, however, the principles compiling it were somewhat different. There was no single principle that stands out in which all organisations got a good result, the scores in this were condensed to the ranges of; not fulfilled, weak, and moderate. The highest average score in this dimension was principle 26 *'The organisation has an internal financial or audit committee'* at 50% or moderate, however this principle only applies to federations with ten or more paid staff members and there are only two organisations that reach this checkmark, KSÍ (football) and the NOC. The second highest principle, which applies to all organisations, was principle 32 *'The board establishes procedures for the processing of complaints in the internal*

regulations' with an average score of 44% or moderate. Two other principles reached a moderate score, principle 23 *'The organisation defines in its statutes those circumstances in which, due to a serious conflict of interest, a person is ineligible to serve as a member of the board'* at 41% and principle 22 *'The board establishes procedures regarding the premature resignation of board members'* at 40%. The lowest scoring principle was principle 28 *'The board annually evaluates its own composition and performance'* with an average score of 1%, not fulfilled. This principle applied to all organisations and is composed of three questions, of which one organisation was able to meet the requirements of one question, SSÍ (swimming). In total, five principles resulted in an average of less than 20%, not fulfilled. Six principles averaged between 20-39%, weak. Finally, three principles reached a moderate score of 40-59% as stated previously.



Figure 6: Accountability - Overall Results

Dimension 4: Societal Responsibility

The last dimension is societal responsibility. This was the worst scoring dimension with an average score of 12%, not fulfilled. The highest score came from the NOC at 49%, moderate, and two organisations shared the worst outcome, KLÍ (bowling) and LH (equestrian) scored 0%, not fulfilled. Within this dimension, no principle scored an average of moderate or better, they all averaged either a weak score or a not fulfilled. The highest scoring principle was principle 37 *'The organisation implements a policy on combating sexual harassment in sport'* with an average of 39%, weak. Another three principles reached an average score of weak; the remaining eight principles all had an average of not fulfilled, below 20%. The worst outcome was from principle 44 *'The organisation implements a policy on promoting the dual career of athletes'* with an average score of 1%. This principle consists of six questions, of which four do not apply to small federations of less than 10 paid staff members. Only one organisation got a single question fulfilled, the NOC. Similarly, principle 41 *'The organisation implements a policy to promote gender equality in sport'* had a low average of 2%. This principle also had six questions within it, of which four did not apply to small federations of less than 10 paid staff members. KSÍ (football) fulfilled the requirements for one of the six questions they were subject to, and the NOC got three of six acceptable, all the small federations scored a 0% in this principle. Of all principles with an average score of not fulfilled, less than 20%, the highest is principle 42 *'The organisation implements a policy to combat match-fixing'* with an average of 10%.



Figure 7: Societal Responsibility - Overall Results

5.2.1 NSGO Results

The average NSGO index score for Icelandic Sport Federations was 38%, which is considered weak based on NSGO labels. The highest average dimension score was Transparency, with 64%, which is considered good. The Democracy (35%) and Accountability (32%) dimensions were both weak. The lowest-ranked dimension was Societal Responsibility with 18%, which is considered not fulfilled.

Table 6:The average NSGO index scores for Icelandic Sport Federations

Sport	Overall	Transparency	Democracy	Accountability	Societal Responsibility	Index
Athletics	36%	77%	33%	24%	8%	Weak
Equestrian	27%	65%	21%	20%	0%	Weak
Football	53%	68%	54%	56%	32%	Moderate
Golf	44%	72%	45%	32%	25%	Moderate
Handball	39%	62%	22%	51%	19%	Weak
NOC	46%	72%	32%	31%	49%	Moderate
Swimming	39%	68%	45%	36%	5%	Weak
Tennis	17%	28%	29%	8%	2%	Not fulfilled
Average	38%	64%	35%	32%	18%	Weak
Max	53%	77%	54%	56%	49%	
Min	17%	28%	21%	8%	0%	



Figure 8: The overall NSGO scores for all federations.

Dimension 1: Transparency

The first dimension was the best one for the Icelandic sport organisations, with a score of 64%. Out of the seven principles included in this dimension, three were labelled ‘very good’; these three are all but one of the principles in the entire Icelandic database that reached this level of excellence. Additionally, within transparency there were two ‘good’ principles. Most of the organisations were ‘very good’ in terms of publishing statutes, internal regulations, and organisation charts, but they lacked multi-annual policy plans (Principle 1). Principles 3 and 5 both rounded up to an average score of 88%, and all organisations had a score of 100% in Principle 3 apart from one, which is the smallest of them all with only two employees and a score of 0%, as no board decisions were available on their website. Similarly, with regard to publishing information about their affiliated clubs and athletes (Principle 5), the organisations either had a score of 100% or 67%, due to the fact that the umbrella organisation ÍSÍ keeps record of and publishes athlete numbers for all sports in Iceland, so some do not have those numbers available on their website. The principle with the lowest average score was Principle 7 (19%): ‘The organisation publishes regulations and reports on the remuneration, including compensation and bonuses, of its board members and management on its website’.



Figure 9: Transparency - NSGO Results

Dimension 2: Democratic processes

Dimension 2, democratic processes, was the second strongest dimension of the Icelandic sport organisations, with an average score of 36% ('weak'). One principle stood out: Board members are democratically (re-)appointed according to clear procedures (Principle 8), where the average score was 88% ('very good'); all individual organisations had a score of 75% or higher for this principle, with four out of eight scoring 100%. Principles 9, 11 and 18 were all classified as 'not fulfilled', with an average score of less than 20%. Of those, principle 18 had the worst outcome, with not one organisation ensuring the participation of volunteers in their policy processes; they all had a score of 0%. The Icelandic sport organisations had a score of 72% ('good') in Principle 13, the general assembly represents all affiliated members and meets at least once a year. The scores ranged from 50% to 100%, the most common unfulfilled indicator had to do with the statutes establishing that the general assembly meets annually; the Icelandic organisations had a biannual requirement instead. In terms of ensuring different stakeholders are represented (Principles 15–19), the score varies from 0% to 50%. As stated above, Principle 18 had a 0% score, while the others were either 'weak' or 'moderate'.



Figure 10: Democracy - NSGO Results

Dimension 3: Internal Accountability

With accountability, the Icelandic sports organisations were labelled ‘weak’ with a score of 31%. No principle within this dimension achieved an average score of ‘good’ or ‘very good’, where the average was close to ‘good’ at 58% but still ranked as ‘moderate’. Most organisations had an external independent auditor review their financial statements. However, due to NSGO standards, only two organisations were large enough and had more than the first indicator apply to them within this principle, in both cases all additional indicators were unfulfilled. Regarding the internal financial or auditing committee, according to the NSGO scoresheet, principle 26 only applies to medium and large federations. Only two organisations met that requirement, ÍSÍ and KSÍ, the average score was 50%. Principle 26 requires organisations to be of medium or large size to apply to them. Only ÍSÍ and KSÍ meet that requirement, with the average score being 50%. The board annually evaluates its own composition and performance (Principle 28) had the worst outcome at 4%. Only one organisation had a document on its evaluation during the past 12 months; however, they did not mandate it in their internal regulations or get external help. A common trend in this segment of the database is that, in most principles, one organisation was labelled as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, but the rest either have no scores or very low scores. Within the organisations that were benchmarked, only three out of 14 principles have no organisation with a score of 60% or higher.



Figure 11: Accountability - NSGO Results

Dimension 4: Societal Responsibility

The last dimension had an average score of 18% or 'not fulfilled', the lowest of all dimensions. Only one of the 12 principles reached an average score of 'moderate': Principle 46, the organisation ensures fair treatment of professional athletes. Within the Icelandic sport setting, only two out of the eight organisations could be classified as semi-professional sports as they are the only ones administering "professional" contracts to their athletes; as such they were the only ones viewed in this principle. Similarly, the principle referring to dual careers, when the organisations view their athletes as non-professionals, the sense of requiring a policy for the dual careers of those athletes may be of less importance. Although this should not lower the need for the organisations to ensure the dual career of their athletes, this is the current status of Icelandic sports and is reflected by the low score. Six principles were 'not fulfilled' and five more were 'weak', giving much room for improvement. Regardless of whether organisation deals with amateur or professional sport, structure with promoting gender equality (Principle 41, 8%), combating sexual harassment (Principle 37, 20%), combating match fixing (Principle 42, 24%), and promoting environmental sustainability (Principle 43, 15%) should all be of importance.



Figure 12: Societal Responsibility - NSGO Results

5.2.2 Results between samples

Results show that the difference in the overall scores between all 34 federations and the NSGO results differ by 10%, as shown in table 7 here below. The eight federations chosen in the NSGO report had a 13% higher overall score than the rest of the 26 federations in Iceland. Looking at the three samples, the 26 federations examined for this thesis give a more accurate depiction on the levels of good governance in Iceland, with a score of 25% overall with all 34 federations together having an overall score of 28%. This is also emphasised by the scores on each dimension, where the NSGO scores are higher overall. Transparency scores differ by 17% with the NSGO scores being 64% against a 47% overall, the Democracy dimension differs by 9%, with a NSGO score of 35% and the overall score being 26% and the Accountability dimension differs by 7%, with a 32% score against a 25% overall score. In both samples the Societal Responsibility dimension was the lowest with a difference of 6% or a 18% NSGO score and a 12% overall score. The overall index for all samples still amounts to a score of "Weak". As such, the low score by the Icelandic sport organisations can, to some extent, be attributed to the setting in which they operate. However, much can be improved.

Table 7: Comparison of the average scores for each sample.

Research	Overall	Transparency	Democracy	Accountability	Societal Responsibility	Index
NSGO Scores (8*)	38%	64%	35%	32%	18%	Weak
Thesis Scores (26*)	25%	42%	23%	22%	11%	Weak
All federations (34*)	28%	47%	26%	25%	12%	Weak
Average	30%	51%	28%	26%	14%	Weak

* (Number of federations)

Chapter 6
Discussion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses what the results of this research imply, what implications they might have and tries to bring overall context to what this all means.

6.2 Discussion

Based on the overall results, Icelandic federations come second to last when compared to the nations already evaluated by the NSGO, only Cyprus scored lower with an average of 27% (National Sports Governance Observer, 2018). These results imply that the Icelandic sport federations do not compare well to those of larger, more populous, European countries and that the Icelandic federations have some way to go before being comparable to their Scandinavian neighbours in Norway (78%) and Denmark (65%) (National Sports Governance Observer, 2018). However, if only the results from the NSGO report are used for comparison, a score of 38% on average would place the Icelandic federations in the middle of all countries evaluated. Five countries score a higher average, and five countries score lower on average. Nevertheless, as the overall results show, the NSGO sample for Icelandic federations does not give an accurate depiction of good governance standards in Iceland. The eight selected federations by chance happened to contain some of the best scoring Icelandic federations. Apart from the NSGO study it would be hard to compare the Icelandic federations to other nations that have not used the same questionnaire to evaluate national sport federations and the only such study outside of the NSGO database was done in the United States, the results there were significantly better than the score in Iceland (58%) (Pielke et al., 2019). The results show that the eight federations chosen for the NSGO report overvalue the level of good governance upheld in Icelandic sport federations, as is evident by the 10% margin in average scores. The eight federations had an average score of 38% whereas all 34 federations combined had an average score of 28%. This could signify that the NSGO report does not have an adequate sample size or that the sample selection was in some way favourable for the Icelandic report. Nevertheless, both scores have the same ranking of weak (20-39%), which in turn yields the same results but it has to be mentioned that six out of the seven highest scoring federations were all part of the NSGO report which explains why those results average higher than the overall average of all the federations combined. Furthermore, larger federations scored higher than the smaller federations, this is evident by the fact that the two highest scoring federations in this research are the only medium sized federations (More than 10, but less than 30 full time employees) in Iceland, with the rest being categorised as small (Less than 10 full time employees). These findings

further emphasize the notion that Icelandic federations operate under the influence of institutional mimetic isomorphism as they all operate in the same field under the same umbrella organisation and achieve a similar score with comparable deficiencies. However, they could do better and make use of documents that the NOC publishes to further implement the mimeticism and have more information on their own websites (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

The overall results show that the Icelandic federations, similar to the other surveyed countries scored the highest in Transparency (47%), which is still considerably worse than the average score in the NSGO database (65%). The Democracy (26%), Accountability (25%) and Societal Responsibility (12%) dimensions are similarly considerably worse than the average score in the NSGO database (44% - 51% - 38%). If the results from the Icelandic NSGO report are compared to the results of the other countries in the NSGO database (*National Sports Governance Observer*, 2018), Iceland scored highest in Transparency (64%), which was close to the average score of the other previously surveyed European countries and Brazil (65%). However, Iceland scored worse in other dimensions compared to average scores of the previous NSGO database; Democracy (44%, compared to (35%), Accountability (51%, compared to (32 %) and Societal Responsibility (38%, compared to (18%). Iceland's scores in these categories only reached a level of 'weak' or 'not fulfilled'.

In the transparency dimension the federations mostly did well in publishing their statutes, internal regulation, and sport rules online. However, almost all of them failed to provide a multi annual policy plan which was explained in multiple interviews as being difficult due to how the government funding is distributed. The NOC is responsible for assigning the funds they receive from the government to all federations and this funding varies annually both from the government to the NOC and from the NOC to individual federations. Such an unstable environment does not benefit the federations when creating a multi-annual policy plan, thus, almost all of them do not have this fulfilled. Only three federations did not publish the agenda or minutes of their general assembly online, and one federation had not yet held its first general assembly as it was founded in late 2019. This information of what happens at the general assembly should be available to all stakeholders and with little effort the federations can improve their transparency by making these documents accessible online. Further improvements could be made by publishing board decisions online, 19 federations do not get a score in this principle as information about what goes on in board meetings was not available. This could easily be adjusted by conducting minutes of the board meetings and making them publicly available. Same goes for annual-

and financial reports which these federations have to hand in to the NOC annually, but somehow quite a few still fail to share these documents with the public by having them made available through their homepage. Additionally, a lack of information regarding board members was apparent. While all organisations did list their board members and most had a general email address listed to reach the board. A majority failed to provide information about previous mandates of the board as well as biographical information and positions held by the board members in other sport organisations. All this information is attainable by the federations and should not be considered a difficult task to complete.

In democratic processes the federations did well in having clear procedures for appointing board members. This can be explained by the mimetic isomorphism of many federations having the same basic statutes, most likely provided by the NOC with few making significant changes to the documents. Similarly, a very good score was achieved with the general assembly representing all affiliated members. Within this principle was also the question whether the general assembly meets every year, this part was inadequate as some federations had a bi-annual general assembly requirement. Although an annually held general assembly could prove beneficial to some extent, certain drawbacks such as the financial cost of hosting the assembly do pose a challenge for some of the smallest federations. A common problem in this dimension was the lack of representation of various stakeholder groups e.g. athletes, referees, coaches, volunteers, and employees with regards to policy processes. As mentioned earlier almost none of the federations have a multi-annual policy plan which also affected the score here. Some of the federations do have referee committees and therefore, that group of stakeholders has some representation. By implementing similar processes in other groups such as a coaches committee and an athletes committee the federations could do better in this dimension. Some indications of the difficulties operating in a small country are visible in certain principles, two federations take steps to achieve a differentiated and balanced composition of their boards. When asked, a number of representatives gave the answer that it was near impossible to select board members based on desired profiles and competencies. The volunteer aspect of the boards limits the number of individuals interested in serving the federations as board members.

In accountability there was a lack of clear statutes or internal regulations regarding most principles. There is a notable absence of a code of conduct applying to board members, management, and staff in most federations. This could be improved by implementing a similar code of conduct as the NOC has and making it available online. Furthermore, matters regarding conflict of interest could be clarified such as when a person is ineligible to serve

as a board member. Again, this proved difficult to do due to size and was mentioned during interviews, the federations do adhere to certain protocols regarding conflict of interest, but those protocols did not cover what the research was requesting. In a country where conflict of interest is bound to occur due to size and familiarity, having clear statutes regarding this should be a priority and not an afterthought. To further improve accountability, the board could implement an annual evaluation of its own composition and performance. This should not be too difficult to accomplish and could even be done in cooperation with the NOC with their supervision. Additionally, the adaptation of an annual meeting schedule so that the public knows more about what will be discussed in board meetings in advance. From what the research shows, most if not all of the boards of the federations have meetings on a regular basis. A simple process of having a document that shows a certain matter will be discussed at a given date at a specific meeting could help achieve a higher accountability score.

Lastly, regarding the societal responsibility dimension, the Icelandic federations achieved a dismal 12% score. This could suggest that the federations are doing little to no work with matters such as combatting doping and match fixing, addressing gender equality, sexual harassment, and discrimination. The problem is not a lack of desire but a deficiency in structured documents detailing objectives and how the federation set out to achieve those objectives. Formal policies regarding the prevention, detection, and combating doping practices are present in Iceland, with the NOC working with the Icelandic anti-doping agency following WADA protocols. For anti-doping procedures, many federations try to cover themselves by stating that they fall under the NOC and follow implementations from the highest authority. However, many fail to provide a proper section or any indication on the homepage where this information should be available. Mentioning that they follow procedures of the NOC or even WADA, during interviews, is not sufficient enough if they do not provide the web page of those organisation's procedures on their own page. In societal responsibility the NOC scored a moderate 49%, well above the average. If the federations follow what the NOC is doing and how they work, the federations could improve their score and increase the average of not fulfilled to a weak or even a moderate score without much effort.

During the interviews with some of the federations representatives, it was revealed that a few of these principles are being implemented, however it is not mentioned in the statutes or internal regulations. Those federations who were interviewed claimed to have unwritten rules that they use in the day-to-day administration of these organisations. This shows that if Icelandic sport federations are using certain structures and unwritten rules there

is a clear need to document these practices that are being used to govern the federations and make them an official part of their rules and regulations. Many federations rely too heavily on the fact that they fall under the NOC umbrella and claim that their federation follows what is being implemented by the governing body without referring to actual documents or policies.

There is a need for more specific policies with clear objectives and actions.

Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter serves as a summary for this thesis by concluding the answers to the research questions set forward at the start, discussing the implications these results could have, what the limiting factors were and what future research on this topic might include.

7.2 Research Summary

The aim of this research was to expand on the preliminary report that the authors had already conducted for the NSGO on good governance in Iceland by utilising the NSGO indicators to assess good governance implemented in Icelandic sport federations. Using the NSGO methodology, all 33 national federations in Iceland along with the national Olympic umbrella were examined and given a score from 0-100% on their standard of good governance. This project includes the research authors did for Play the game in 2020 by expanding on the eight Icelandic federations examined initially and taking a look at all 34 federations in Iceland. Before data collection began the following research questions were made:

- How do Icelandic sport federations compare to those of larger European countries?

Based on the results of this research Icelandic sport federations do not compare well to those of larger European countries. With the Icelandic federations (28%) scoring second to last when compared to the nations already evaluated by the NSGO, with only Cyprus scoring lower with an average score of 27%.

- Do the eight federations chosen by the NSGO project give an accurate indication on how all 34 federations in Iceland score overall?

The results show that the eight federations chosen for the NSGO report do not give an accurate indication on good governance in Iceland. The NSGO report overvalued the level of good governance being upheld in Icelandic sport federations, as is shown by the 10% difference in scoring.

- Do larger federations score better than smaller ones when it comes to good governance protocols?

Larger federations do score higher than the smaller federations, this is evident by the fact that the two highest scoring federations in this research are the only medium sized

federations (More than 10, but fewer than 30 full time employees) in Iceland, with the rest being categorised as small (Fewer than 10 full time employees).

7.3 Managerial Implications

Being a small nation could easily be a strength when developing good governance practices and Iceland certainly has an opportunity to re-evaluate their governance protocols. Icelandic federations are vulnerable due to their size, lack of skills, lack of resources (funding), and blurred lines of good governance practices. Icelandic federations have an overall low score as they do not have various practices in place and there is a need to address these issues.

There is a lack of funding that causes federations to implement only the most basic functions for their everyday operations. Some argue that they need more staff in order to improve their operation but having no room for that in their budget. While some sports appear to be more popular and attractive to others, some seem to struggle filling board positions and getting people qualified enough to make the changes necessary. Another question might be if there is a lack of knowledge and if the NOC can do better when it comes to informing member federations of their responsibilities of good governance.

There is also a need to develop routines that promote good governance protocols and make sure they are being followed. One of the improvements that Icelandic Federations can make is in defining and creating more specific actions aimed at mitigating problems regarding societal responsibility. The NSGO score sheet dictates that federations must have objectives and specific actions in their policies in order to fulfil set indicators. There were examples when federations had objectives in certain policies, but they would often be rather broad and unspecific. In order to improve, more specific goals are needed in their policy making. There may be some reasons for why the Icelandic Federations find it difficult to employ better practices. It is not that they are unwilling to comply; rather, they find it appropriate to operate in a way that they feel is more suitable for their setting.

Based on the results it is clear that the structure the federations need to have in order to receive funding from the NOC are being accomplished, like having an achievement plan, which is a requirement by the NOC if federations want to apply for a grant from their fund. Even though this is not covered by the principles in this research, it was still noticed that every federation has this on their website. Which brings up the question if these policies of good governance might need to come with a price and if federations that do not follow them might get their funding cut?

7.4 Limitations of the Study

Data collection was done to the fullest extent by going over documents and other items such as news articles available on the federation's websites. Yet, as clarified by the NSGO standard, an interview with a federation representative is the best practice possible. Interviews were conducted with representatives from seven out of the eight NSGO report federations. All of which declared an interest in the interviews but one failed to respond when setting a date. For the 26 additional federations that were evaluated for this thesis research, a decision was made to not interview them. The decision was made based on a few obstacles; the time it would take to set up and conduct all interviews as well as Covid-19 protocols restricting social meetings, furthermore, the Icelandic government had banned all sports for a majority of 2020 and early 2021. The impact the restrictions of sport activities had was that the federations were busy scheduling how and when to start the tournaments and events that had been postponed, subsequently they had little to no time for interviews with the researchers. It was also deemed not necessary by the researchers to conduct the interviews, based on these obstacles and the fact how similarly these federations operate and already having important information from the seven interviews conducted prior. A compromise was the creation of a document with 27 indicators that the researchers believed the federation representative could provide answers to. Thus, an email with this document was sent to all federations as well as a short clarification regarding the project. From the 26 emails sent, five federations responded with answers and evidence as requested by the researchers. Therefore, a limiting factor could be the lack of responses, with 21 federations not giving any additional feedback, in determining the overall standard of their good governance protocols. There is also a question if interviews with all the federations is needed in order to get a more accurate description on the levels of good governance in Icelandic sporting federations.

7.5 Future research

No doubt, being a small nation is no excuse for not having adequate good governance protocols and, yet Icelandic sport federations should be able to improve only with some institutional support and guidance. Perhaps, the codification of good governance (i.e., the development and introduction of a Code) is a possible way forward for Icelandic sport. Creating a framework in which Icelandic federations can base their governance on and assist them could prove to be a decisive factor in improving the overall standard of good governance in Iceland. This framework could be based on the indicators in the NSGO

framework which are realistically suitable for the Icelandic sporting environment, along with similar frameworks that have been introduced in other countries. The pressure of employing good governance protocols is connected with compliance which can be seen as both a part of mimetic isomorphism and coercive. It is mimetic based on following other countries that have already implemented similar practices but can be coercive if the highest authority (The NOC) creates an environment where federations are forced to comply. If the codification of good governance is implemented within the Icelandic sporting environment that links protocols of good governance with funding many federations would be forced into complying seeing that most of them depend heavily on the funding from the NOC.

Icelandic federations seem to need some extra motivation when it comes to implementing good governance protocols and the question is if educating them on these procedures will suffice or if more extreme measures are needed such as, making them legally bound to follow or perhaps having their funding from the NOC depend on their standard of good governance.

The authors of this thesis report no conflict of interest.

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Appendix 1: NSGO Scoresheet (Dashboard)

Appendix 2: NSGO Scoresheet (Transparency)



Dimension	# Principles	Principles used	# Indicators	Indicators used	Aggregated indicator score	Dimension score	Dimension Label
Transparency	7	0	42	0	Incomplete	Incomplete	not relevant

Principle 1		Principle applies?	Comment			Score	Weight	Principle Score	Principle label
1	The organisation publishes its statutes/ constitution, internal regulations, organisation chart, sports rules and multi-annual policy plan on its website.	Yes	Please comment			0	0	not relevant	not relevant
Indicator		**Score (yes / no / NA)**	**Evidence**	**Comment**	**Best practice?**	**Score**	**Weight**		
1.1	Does the organisation publish its statutes on its website and are they retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.2	Does the organisation provide its statutes to its internal stakeholders through email or a protected member section of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.3	Does the organisation publish its internal regulations on its website and are they retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.4	Does the organisation provide its internal regulations to its internal stakeholders through email or a protected member section of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.5	Does the organisation publish its sports rules on its website and are they retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.6	Does the organisation provide its sports rules to its internal stakeholders through email or a protected member section of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.7	Does the organisation publish its multi-annual policy plan on its website and are they retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of its website?					Answer missing	0		
1.8	Does the organisation provide its multi-annual policy plan to its internal stakeholders through email or a protected member section of its website?					Answer missing	0		

Principle 2		Principle applies?	Comment			Score	Weight	Principle Score	Principle label
2	The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general assembly meeting on its website.	Yes	Please comment			0	0	not relevant	not relevant
Indicator		**Score (yes / no / NA)**	**Evidence**	**Comment**	**Best practice?**	**Score**	**Weight**		
2.1	Did the organisation publish the agenda of its latest general assembly meeting on its website before the meeting took place and is it retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of the website?					Answer missing	0		
2.2	Does the published agenda contain the various agenda items with a word of explanation, the list of topics to be discussed and specify which items shall be put to the vote?					Answer missing	0		
2.3	Does the organisation provide the agenda of its general assembly meeting to its internal stakeholders via email a protected member section of the organisation's website before the meeting takes place?					Answer missing	0		

Appendix 3: Email sent to federations (In Icelandic)

Stjórnarhættir Íslenskra Íþróttasambanda

ÁG

To
Cc

Reply | Reply All | Forward | ...

Stjórnarhættir - Spurningar.xlsx
15 KB

Translate message to: English | Never translate from: Icelandic

Til framkvæmdarstjóra (og/eða forseta)

Við erum Garðar Óli Ágústsson og Jón Reynir Reynisson, mastersnemar við Háskólann í Molde, Noregi.

Við viljum að kynna ykkur fyrir áhugaverðu verkefni sem við erum hluti af. Verkefnið nefnist "National Sport Governance Observer" (NSGO) og er þetta liður í mastersverkefni okkar. Meginmarkmið verkefnisins er að aðstoða og hvetja sérsambönd í íþróttum til þess að auka gæði stjórnunarhátta og byggja upp kunnáttu um góða stjórnunarhætti með því að meta stjórnarhætti sem eru til staðar nú þegar.

Þetta verkfæri (rannsókn) er í raun og veru frammistöðupróf sem mælir starfsvenjur og stjórnunarhætti íþróttasérsambanda. Þetta er ferli sem að rannsakar 274 vísbendingar um góða stjórnunarhætti sem meta framkvæmd 46 meginreglna um góða stjórnunarhætti sem falla undir 4 mælieiningar: gagnsæi, lýðræði, innri ábyrgð og eftirlit, og samfélagslega ábyrgð. Þetta er hluti af stærri rannsókn sem ber saman stjórnunarhætti á milli landa (þessi rannsókn hefur verið framkvæmd á stór, miðlungsstór og lítil lönd, sem og tekur mið af stærð sérsambanda. Núna erum við að framkvæma þessa rannsókn á íslandi, þ.e.a.s. kortleggja góða stjórnunarhætti íslenskra íþróttasérsambanda, komast að styrkleikum og veikleikum – og hvernig við finnum leiðir til þess að þróa betri stjórnarhætti sem er mikilvægt fyrir alla hagsmunaaðila. Hér er mikið að læra og góður grundvöllur til að bera sig saman við önnur innlend og erlend sérsambönd.

Í hnotskurn: Tilgangurinn með þessu verkefni er að kortleggja íslenska stjórnunarhætti með þeim tilgangi að stuðla að betri stjórnsýslu.

Í fyrstu umferð höfum við safnað saman tiltækum upplýsingum á heimasíðum sérsambandanna. Í næstu umferð óskum við eftir að fá nánari upplýsingar varðandi nokkur atriði. Hér munum við mögulega hreinsa upp allan misskilning, fylla út „eyður" í gagnaöflun og gefa sérsamböndunum tækifæri á að útskýra ef þörf er á. Allt þetta til þess að tryggja að á við fáum þann besta og réttan árangur í verkefninu.

Meðfylgjandi er skjal með spurningum sem við biðjum ykkur (einhvern aðila innan sambandsins sem er vel að sér í stjórnarháttum þess) til þess að líta yfir og fylla inn í. Eins og við sögðum að þá er þetta til þess fallið að allar upplýsingar séu sem réttastar. Þá er einnig í boði ef sambönd óska eftir því að fá sendan allan spurningalistann til að yfirfara.

Ef það eru einhverjar spurningar eða eitthvað óljóst ekki hika við að hafa samband við okkur,

Ef þið hafið tök á væri óskandi ef þið gætuð svarað þessum lista fyrir

Með fyrirfram þökkum!