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dc.contributor.authorHaugen, Kjetil K.
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-03T09:02:50Z
dc.date.available2023-11-03T09:02:50Z
dc.date.created2021-06-24T10:32:58Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationMathematics for applications. 2021, 10 (1), 25-35.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1805-3610
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3100427
dc.description.abstractThis article applies game theory to explain why football clubs have a tendency to sack their managers when relegation is a realistic option. As opposed to coach succession literature, which typically reports contradiction between theory and practice, this article produces credible explanations for this “problem”. In addition, observations indicating accelerated manager replacements in modern professional football are also easily explained. Derived Nash equilibria are also quite robust to parameter assumptions and hence the possible variations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.urihttp://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/10_1.html
dc.titleThe manager sack race gameen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber25-35en_US
dc.source.volume10en_US
dc.source.journalMathematics for applicationsen_US
dc.source.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.13164/ma.2021.03
dc.identifier.cristin1918084
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


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